Pleasure, in the inclusive usages most important in moral psychology, ethical theory, and the studies of mind, includes all joy and gladness — all our feeling good, or happy. It is often contrasted with similarly inclusive pain, or suffering, which is similarly thought of as including all our feeling bad. Contemporary psychology similarly distinguishes between positive affect and negative affect.[1..

INTRODUCTION When Liberalism was first published in 1911 a critical reviewer in the London Spectator observed, "It would be impossible to have the essential ...

"The compiling of a bibliography requires both a thorough knowledge of the subject . . . and the ability to discriminate effectively. Success depends as much on the clear definition of focus as on the evaluation of the texts considered. Orr succeeds on each count, thereby rendering an invaluable service to students and scholars alike. . . . Particularly interesting is the inclusion of works devoted to the interrelatedness of existentialism and the political and social sciences. And extremely helpful are (...) the notations referring the researcher to sections of a work either of particular significance or pertinent to a specific point of view. An excellent introduction emphasizes the movement away from the fundamental (ontological) concerns of existential thought. . . . Orr's effort to resituate the research within the original dimensions of existentialism and phenomenology as exploratory processes, as opposed to intellectual systems, is most commendable."FRENCH REVIEW. (shrink)

The renormalization group is used to analyze the behavior of certain gravitationally significant renormalized coupling constants under a scaling of the spacetime curvature. After discussing a simple example, the results are summarized for a class of grand unified theories.

Political authority is not eliminable, even if in a globalizing world order the particulars of its exercise might be undergoing a transformation. What matters to political philosophy is whether or not its existence and exercise can be justified. In this paper I begin by contrasting two paradigmatic approaches to justifications of political authority and political obligation: political naturalism and political voluntarism. Having set the stage for the debate, I connect Aquinas’s account of political authority with the former—though one will not (...) find a full-fledged version of that account in this paper. More importantly, I connect Aquinas’s naturalist defense of political obligation to a non-instrumental account of the common good, though the bulk of the paper deals with what I argue are failed attempts to offer non-naturalist accounts of the common good as alternative natural law defenses of political authority. (shrink)

Depue & Morrone-Strupinsky's (D&M-S's) language suggests that, unlike Kent Berridge, they may allow that the activity of a largely subcortical system, which is presumably often introspectively and cognitively inaccessible, constitutes affectively felt experience even when so. Such experience would then be phenomenally conscious without being reflexively conscious or cognitively access-conscious, to use distinctions formulated by the philosopher Ned Block.

Originally published: New York: Grossman Publishers, 1969.

Recently, there has been renewed interest in the search for low-mass magnetic monopoles. At the University of Oklahoma we are performing an experiment (Fermilab E882) using material from the old D0 and CDF detectors to set limits on the existence of Dirac monopoles of masses of the order of 500 GeV. To set such limits, estimates must be made of the production rate of such monopoles at the Tevatron collider, and of the binding strength of any such produced monopoles to (...) matter. Here we sketch the still primitive theory of such interactions, and indicate why we believe a credible limit may still be obtained. On the other hand, there have been proposals that the classic Euler–Heisenberg Lagrangian together with duality could be employed to set limits on magnetic monopoles having masses less than 1 TeV, based on virtual, rather than real processes. The D0 collaboration at Fermilab has used such a proposal to set mass limits based on the nonobservation of pairs of photons each with high transverse momentum. We critique the underlying theory, by showing that the cross section violates unitarity at the quoted limits and is unstable with respect to radiative corrections. We therefore believe that no significant limit can be obtained from the current experiments, based on virtual monopole processes. (shrink)

We consider a proportional-prize contest to forecast future events, and show that, in equilibrium, this mechanism possesses perfect forecasting ability for any group size when the contestants share common knowledge about the probabilities by which future events realize. Data gathered in a laboratory experiment confirm the performance invariance to group size. By contrast, when realization probabilities are not common knowledge, there are some differences across group sizes. The mechanism operates marginally better with three or four compared to two players. However, (...) this effect is mainly driven by players’ behavior rather than by differences in the beliefs they form about the realization probabilities. (shrink)

This essay challenges a growing consensus among Aquinas scholars who attribute to him a pro-passion attitude, linking his virtue theory to accounts of emotion that see the emotions in a primarily positive light. There are good reasons for thinking Aquinas far more skeptical of the role to be played by emotion in the virtuous life—indeed, one can safely argue, in agreement with Aquinas, that the emotions are often threats to and so in need of control by the virtues. I focus (...) on the ideal of reason’s control over the emotions in the essay in contrast with the work of Robert Miner whose understanding of Aquinas on the passions and virtues tends to downplay the dominating role that reason plays in the moral theory of Aquinas. For Aquinas IRC is central to the normativity of the virtues that relate to the emotions. In contrast, Miner appears to minimize the need for the emotions to be controlled, which entails a certain elevation of the emotions to a nearly co-equal status with reason in Aquinas’s moral theory. Miner adopts two argumentative strategies to achieve this valorization of emotion in Aquinas, but I find both exegetically inaccurate and experientially deficient. (shrink)

This paper compares the views of Hegel and Schelling regarding the problem of individuation, i.e. the question of what makes an individual (a) numerically distinct from others and (b) the very individual it is. My focus is on how Hegel approaches this problem in his metaphysics and how that relates to Schelling’s views as articulated in his ‘negative philosophy’. While Hegelians like Robert Stern and Karen Ng are optimistic that Hegel can solve the problem of individuation, I argue that Schelling (...) puts forward an objection that both challenges Hegel’s account and provides a rationale for taking seriously Schelling’s own insistence on a pre-logical dimension of being. (shrink)

If, as some physicians of the national malaise claim, the American dream is dead and our history as a nation has reached its end, it seems fitting to reopen the question of what America is - or should be, or what was once thought she ought to be. Although we can hardly expect this to be persuaded any longer by the historic dreams of the new Adam, a review of that century-old challenge to debate, founded in the possibility of an (...) achieved human perfection, can provide u with humane instruction in understanding the present and the future. The author here gives us that review through the eyes of a major nineteenth-century commentator. Orestes Brownson's work is a significant part of American history, especially of its intellectual history. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., wrote of Brownson: "...one feels the pathos of modernity in this stormy pilgrim...His life still touches contemporary nerves - from the antagonisms of capital and labor to the place of the Catholics in American society, from the nature of American culture to the death of God..." To expect solutions from - to expect agreement with - Brownson is to ask for more than this book intends. Much of his mastery was in the isolation and sharply etched presentation of the question. Clarity and depth of thought are everywhere reflected in his work. Whither that thought leads is clearly the work of ultimate judgment by the reader. By allowing Brownson to speak for himself, and confining critical comments chiefly to footnotes, the author presents him as still vigorously alive and, it is hoped, as a formative influence in America's future.'. (shrink)

Rolls's preliminary definitions of emotion and speculative restriction of consciousness, including emotional sentience, to humans, display behaviorist prejudice. Reinforcement and causation are not by themselves sufficient conceptual resources to define either emotion or the directedness of thought and motivated action. For any adequate definition of emotion or delimitation of consciousness, new physiology, such as Rolls is contributing to, and also the resources of other fields, will be required.

Let us begin by assembling some signs of the present philosophical situation. On the one hand, the most important living French philosopher, Alain Badiou, calls for a “return to Plato,” despite the movement of anti-Platonism that dominated French and German thought in the 20 th century. On the other hand, the present moment sees a resurgence of naturalism in philosophy in general (including and especially Anglophone analytic philosophy), despite the criticisms of naturalism that have appeared throughout the 20 th century. (...) Phenomenology seems to be at the center of both of these movements. On the one hand, it is the idea of a mathematized ontology that requires the return to Plato, a mathematized ontology constructed without a reflection on its transcendental grounds. On the other, the resurgence of naturalism is so strong that a book could be imagined and published with the bastard name of Naturalizing Phenomenology , as if the transcendental moment of phenomenology did not transform the very meaning of nature. These signs seem to indicate that we have entered into a phase of regression or even decline in philosophical thinking. If this interpretation of the signs is correct, if we have indeed entered into a phase of regression -- a twofold regression toward Platonism and toward naturalism -- we must ask the following question: is it possible for us to define something like a project or even a research agenda that would allow us to define a way of thinking that might lead us out of the present situation, a situation, it must be said, that seems dire for philosophy in general? If we can determine such a research agenda, perhaps we can also begin to understand what the tradition of “continental philosophy” has stood for. (shrink)